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Abstract 
 
In the UK, the increasingly dominant assumption is that the big cities are the motor of 
regional economic growth.  This city-centric view stands in marked contrast to the pre-2000 
assumption that Britain’s largest cities were actually the main focus of declining employment 
and population.  Drawing on a range of theoretical ideas and evidence, this article questions 
the view that the big cities are the key drivers of UK regional growth.  It recognises that there 
have been important changes in trends, notably in London, but argues that the geography of 
recent economic trends in the UK is largely one of regional divergence.  There is scant 
evidence that the big provincial cities perform better than other places – in fact rather the 
opposite.  The relationship between the big cities and their hinterlands is one of 
interdependence.  The article also argues that the performance of UK cities is deeply 
intertwined with the structure of UK economic growth. 
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Introduction 
 
This article aims to question the increasingly dominant assumption that big cities are the 
motor of UK regional economic growth.  It argues instead that the role of UK cities in regional 
growth is more complex and variegated, with interactions between cities, their immediate 
hinterlands and wider regions that work in both directions.  The article also argues that the 
performance of UK cities is deeply intertwined with the structure of national economic growth 
and that urban trends in the UK over the last twenty years are to a significant extent a 
reflection of regional divergence between north and south and of a model of growth based 
on consumer spending and debt that looks hard to sustain. 
 
In challenging the view that big cities are the motor of UK regional growth, the article draws 
on a range of theoretical ideas and empirical evidence rather than on the results of a single 
new research study.  The focus is mainly on Britain’s big cities, particularly the second-tier 
cities occupying the rung below London in the national settlement hierarchy.  This choice is 
made on two grounds.  First, these cities have been the main focus of recent policy attention 
in the UK.  Second, big cities have been emphasised in contemporary theory on urban and 
regional growth and productivity. 
 
The first part of the paper, below, summarises the claims that are now often made on behalf 
of UK cities and explains how they are shaping the public policy agenda.  This is then 
compared with the pre-2000 view of UK cities, which in stark contrast characterised them as 
the principal location of job loss and population decline.  This leads to a discussion of how 
much has really changed in UK urban trends.  The article then moves on to consider the 
sorts of economic activities cities are ‘good for’ and, conversely, the economic strengths of 
non-city areas.  This in turn leads to consideration of the interdependencies between cities 
and their hinterlands.  Finally, the article looks to the future and considers the composition of 
economic growth required to sustain long-term expansion in the UK economy and how this 
might influence the balance between cities and other places. 
 
A definitional point does however need clarifying first.  This concerns exactly what is meant 
by ‘cities’.  In recent times in the UK the term has been used loosely to describe more or less 
any built-up area, including some relatively small ‘cities’.  The analyses by the Centre for 
Cities (2015a, 2015b), which cover 64 ‘primary urban areas’ across the UK, are prominent 
examples (and are based on contiguous built-up areas) but the same classification has also 
been used in other reports on the performance of UK cities (for example Parkinson et al 
2006, Martin et al 2014).  Many of these primary urban areas are not really ‘cities’ at all, at 
least not in the sense that the term would be generally understood.  Instead they are 
modest-sized towns (e.g. Blackpool, Telford, Hastings, Grimsby, Chatham) and sometimes 
they also include within their boundaries a substantial hinterland of even smaller places (e.g. 
Barnsley, Wakefield and Mansfield, which each include numerous former mining villages).  
Relatively little of the UK – principally only the most rural areas – falls outside a ‘city’ on this 
overly-generous definition. 
 
In raising doubts about the role of cities as motors of UK regional growth, this article 
essentially questions only the role of the very largest cities – that is, London plus the dozen 
or so biggest cities in the rest of the country.  The article nevertheless recognises that the 
built-up areas of these big cities do in some cases spill out well beyond the boundaries of the 
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local authority districts at their core: Manchester, for example, lies at the core of a 
conurbation which includes a number of substantial surrounding towns such as Bolton, Bury, 
Rochdale, Oldham and Stockport.  Some of the ideas and evidence presented here relate to 
just the core city whereas others refer the wider built-up urban area. 
 
 
The new conventional wisdom 
 
The UK national government and civil servants for a long time have been characterised as 
somewhat aspatial in their thinking (Marvin and May 2003).  Although this no doubt remains 
the case in most sector-based departments, that cities have come over the last decade to 
occupy a central role in so much contemporary thinking on UK regional economic growth is 
beyond doubt.  The runaway growth of London as a centre of population and jobs is widely 
accepted as one of the defining features of twenty-first century Britain.  Away from London, 
the Core Cities group of local authorities – comprising (in England) Birmingham, Bristol, 
Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield , and recently 
augmented by Glasgow (in Scotland) and Cardiff (in Wales) – have sought to position their 
areas as drivers of regional growth (Core Cities 2013).  To deliver their vision, the Core 
Cities group have called for the extensive devolution of powers and finance from central 
government to their areas.  “Cities drive growth and the way we run them shapes the 
economy” claim the Core Cities (2013, p.5). 
 
The Core Cities’ message has found support across the political spectrum.  The Heseltine 
Report, commissioned by the Coalition Government (Heseltine 2012), backed the devolution 
of powers and funding to the big cities.  The Adonis Review for the Labour Opposition 
(Adonis 2014) conveyed a remarkably similar message.  The foundations for these confident 
‘pro-city’ statements were laid by earlier reports that raised the profile of cities in central 
government thinking, in particular the State of the English Cities (Parkinson et al 2006) and 
the Eddington Report Transport’s role in sustaining the UK’s productivity and 
competitiveness (Eddington 2006).  The State of the English Cities report identified the 
reversal of decades of decline in England’s conurbations, the importance of cities in 
connecting to the global economy, and the concentration of new fast-growing knowledge-
intensive industries in cities.  The Eddington Report recommended prioritising transport 
investments that relieve congestion in cities and better connect cities to their hinterlands in 
order to widen and deepen city-regional labour markets (Eddington 2006). 
 
A number of academics (for example Fujita et al 1999, Graham 2007, Combes et al 2011) 
have provided an intellectual underpinning for the Core Cities’ argument and have won 
remarkable endorsement from HM Treasury on the importance of cities for national 
economic growth.  Specifically, they have stressed ideas prevalent in the ‘New Economic 
Geography’ (NEG) and ‘New Urban Economics’ (NUE) about ‘agglomeration economies’ 
that benefit larger cities and in theory give the businesses located there a competitive 
advantage over businesses elsewhere. 
 
‘Old’ economic geography emphasised the importance of transport costs in influencing the 
location of economic activity, evidenced by the location of industry close to raw materials in 
early industrial times.  Since then, improved global and national transport connections have 
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allowed firms, firstly, to concentrate activity in fewer, larger operations in order to exploit 
greater economies of scale deriving from establishment size and, secondly, to have a 
greater choice of locations and so take advantage of agglomeration advantages in cities 
(Krugman 1991).  A critical insight of Krugman’s 1991 NEG analysis is that improved 
transport connectivity raises competition between places, which can in turn lead to a 
reduction in economic activity in less competitive cities. 
 
The NUE emphasise the increasing importance of formal and informal interactions and 
knowledge spillovers that can take place in large and diverse urban agglomerations between 
economic actors and lead to greater competition and innovation.  Agglomeration economies 
in cities are also thought to include: the concentration of knowledge-driven sectors (Porter 
1990, Florida 2002); a diversity of businesses that foster knowledge spillovers between 
industries (Jacobs 1960); a density of information on market conditions and opportunities 
(Glaeser 2011); a depth and range of demand and supply which raise competition and 
efficiency (Combes and Overman 2004); deep labour markets reducing risk and improving 
labour market matching (Overman et al 2010); and critical mass to support specialist 
consumer demand (Glaeser 2001, Gottlieb and Glaeser 2006).     
 
More traditionally, Marshall (1890) identified that local industrial specialisation can raise 
productivity through easier access to a large and skilled workforce and to specialist suppliers 
and customers, which serve to reduce search and transactions costs.  Crucially, although 
Marshallian industrial localisation may occur in cities, it can also occur in smaller towns and 
relatively un-urbanised districts.  Another distinguishing feature of the agglomeration benefits 
of the NEG and NEU from traditional Marshallian localisation benefits, is that the NEG and 
NEU stress the role of sectoral diversity (which is in turn linked to city size), whereas 
Marshall stressed the importance of sectoral specialisation. 
 
The dominance of these ideas in the UK is already resulting in tangible policy initiatives.  
London’s Elected Mayor and Assembly have for some while had control over transport, 
housing and economic development budgets that elsewhere in England remain the preserve 
of the Westminster government.  However, similar devolved powers are now being extended 
on a piecemeal basis through City Deals, notably to Manchester (Greater Manchester 
Combined Authority 2014).  There is pressure for the big cities and their surrounding local 
authorities to cluster together into ‘city regions’ and to pool powers into ‘combined 
authorities’.  The distribution of financial resources to Local Enterprise Partnerships (LEPs) 
in England, through the Growth Deals announced in 2014 (Department for Communities and 
Local Government 2014), has also allocated more on a per capita basis to the big city LEPs 
than most other areas. 
 
Meanwhile, the Westminster government is prioritising investment in high-speed rail links 
between the big cities – initially HS2 between London and Birmingham and then on to 
Manchester and Leeds, and a possible HS3 linking the big cities of northern England (HS2 
Ltd 2015).  The theory is that by shortening journey times, the big cities outside London will 
be able to benefit from greater agglomeration economies arising from enhanced proximity 
and thereby begin to match London’s success.  Most recently, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer has spoken about developing the ‘Northern Powerhouse’, with Manchester at its 
core, as a driver for the economic revival of northern England (Osborne 2015). 
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The new conventional wisdom may be summarised as being that the big cities in the UK 
offer the best prospects for economic growth and for leading the revival of their surrounding 
regions. 
 
 
Shaky theoretical foundations of the new conventional wisdom 
 
International evidence on the effects of agglomeration on economic performance is mixed, 
not least because of difficulties with measurement and definitions (in particular spatial scale).  
Another problem arises in attributing causality between, on the one hand, proximity between 
firms (i.e. agglomeration) and, on the other hand, successful firms simply co-locating in the 
same place for other reasons (e.g. unexciting ‘old’ economic geography factors such as 
access to the transport system or availability of suitable premises).  In a study across 
European countries, Gardiner et al (2011) found only a weak link between national economic 
growth and the degree to which economic activity is spatially concentrated. Duranton and 
Overman (2005) found that only just over half (52%) of manufacturing firms in the UK were 
located in specialised industry clusters.  Krugman, one of the key architects of the NEG, later 
concluded that returns to scale (internal and external) have peaked because of congestion 
and high costs in cities and improvements in ICT and human capital facilitate networking and 
contracting to take place over longer distances (Krugman 2009).  The NUE in particular (less 
so the NEG) tends to analyse cities as single entities somewhat divorced from their position 
in the national system of settlements and their wider regional setting (Dijkstra 2013). 
 
In applying the NEG or NUE to Britain, two key features of Britain’s settlement system need 
to be born in mind.  First, it is dominated by London’s size and world city role.  Second, 
Britain’s second-tier cities are relatively close together in northern England’s former industrial 
heartland (particularly Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester and Sheffield) which plausibly limits the 
extent to which any one can grow on a large scale.  The UK’s HS3 proposals imply that high-
speed rail connections can create an integrated labour market to rival London and the 
southeast, yet the passenger capacity of high-speed trains relative to the number of jobs and 
the quality of onward connections from city centres make this seem implausible. 
 
The relevance of this new conventional wisdom to Britain’s urban system is open to 
question.  NEG and NUE draw heavily on empirical evidence from the USA, where the 
largest cities do indeed display the greatest productivity (Rosenthal and Strange 2004, 
Rozenfeld et al 2011), growth (Glaeser et al 1992) and innovation (Carlino et al 2007).  
However, this large city effect is not replicated across developed nations.  Analysis by the 
OECD showed that medium-sized cities (defined as around one million inhabitants) across 
the OECD have greater productivity than the very largest cities (OECD 2006).  Analysis for 
the UK indicates that city size is only weakly associated with both productivity (OECD 2006) 
and growth (Martin et al 2014), and both these UK studies reveal that many small cities (in 
the range 200-500k residents) display the strongest performance on both productivity and 
growth, often based on specialised high-tech sectors more consistent with traditional 
Marshallian industrial localisation benefits that do not require large cities.  Synthesising 
international evidence, Dijkstra et al (2013) conclude that “amongst rich countries the large 
city effect is primarily confined to the US, Japan and Korea, and to a smaller extent to 
Canada and Australia, along with a few individual outliers such as London and Paris” 
(p.337). 
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The new conventional wisdom to Britain is that the British debate has been unduly shaped 
by the meteoric growth of its largest city London and the notion that this success can be 
replicated elsewhere.  Yet, as a world city, the UK’s capital is strongly influenced by the 
global economy, allowing it to frequently buck national UK trends (Sassen 2002).  London is 
demographically distinctive from the rest of the UK and receives the highest per capital 
public spending of all English regions (Martin et al 2015).  Finally, London is an outlier on 
recent growth compared to other large European cities which have tended to stagnate or 
decline since the new millennium (Dijkstra et al 2013). 
 
 
Shaky empirical foundations of the new conventional wisdom: the pre-2000 view of 
UK cities 
 
For anyone who has studied longer-term economic trends, this present-day enthusiasm for 
cities as drivers of UK regional economic growth stands in sharp contrast to the pre-2000 
view, backed strongly by data, that Britain’s big cities were the main centres of job loss and 
population decline.  Conversely, smaller towns and rural areas were seen as the main 
locations of growth, not just in cities’ immediate hinterland but also much further afield, well 
beyond the influence of urban commuting networks.  Cities were viewed as the problem, not 
the solution, and attention was often focussed on the scale and severity of ‘inner city’ 
problems (see for example Lawless 1981).  These problems of urban decline were not 
uniquely British but seemed to be shared by a number of other advanced western 
economies, not least the United States. 
 
The scale of the urban decline is illustrated by London’s population, which reached an all-
time peak (in the Greater London area) of 8.6m just before the Second World War.  
Thereafter it fell steadily to a nadir of just 6.8m at the beginning of the 1990s (Inwood 1998). 
Since the early 1990s London’s population has risen again but is only just re-approaching its 
previous peak.  In several other of the UK’s biggest cities – Glasgow, Liverpool and 
Manchester for example – the population remains well below peak levels and only reverted 
to growth around the turn of the millennium after declining throughout most of the second 
half of the twentieth century. 
 
Suburbanisation and wider commuting networks accounted for some of the population 
decline at the core of the big urban areas, but the urban areas as a whole were still major 
centres of job loss and the smaller places beyond the cities were where growth was mostly 
occurring.  Much of this was attributable to what became known as the ‘urban-rural shift’ in 
manufacturing.  The scale of this shift was immense.  Between 1960 and 1981, 
manufacturing employment in London fell by 690,000, or 52 per cent, and in the six main 
conurbations elsewhere in the country (Birmingham, Glasgow, Manchester, Merseyside, 
Tyneside and West Yorkshire) manufacturing employment fell by 990,000, or 43 per cent.  
By contrast, manufacturing employment in small towns held up more or less unchanged and 
in rural areas there was growth of 24 per cent (Fothergill et al 1985).  Loss of manufacturing 
jobs in urban areas had knock-on consequences for local service sector businesses and 
helped trigger migration to places beyond the cities where jobs were more readily available.  
By the end of the 1990s, the dominant discourse was still of the jobs gap in Britain’s cities 
(Turok and Edge 1999). 
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The causes of the urban-rural shift in manufacturing eventually became firmly established.  
Physical relocation out of cities to other areas accounted for relatively little of the overall 
shift.  Closures and redundancies were occurring fairly evenly in cities and elsewhere, but 
job growth was disproportionately concentrated in smaller towns and rural areas.  This in 
turn owed a great deal to the greater availability of physical space for expansion, both on 
new and existing sites (Fothergill and Gudgin 1982, Fothergill et al 1985). 
 
The resulting distribution of manufacturing jobs across Britain in the second decade of the 
twenty-first century is radically different to two generations ago (Fothergill and Gore 2013).  
There are far fewer manufacturing jobs in total, though the big cities retain the largest 
absolute concentrations.  However, manufacturing now typically accounts for a higher 
percentage of total employment in many rural or semi-rural areas than in cities, with some of 
the very highest shares in places where particularly large plants are located.  Birmingham 
district, with the largest single concentration of manufacturing jobs in the UK (40,000) and a 
reputation as a manufacturing heartland, actually has a share of jobs in manufacturing (8 per 
cent) that is marginally below the national average.  In Leeds the proportion is also 8 per 
cent, in Newcastle 5 per cent and in Manchester just 4.5 per cent.  By contrast, the 
proportion exceeds 20 per cent in several districts in Durham, Lancashire and Derbyshire. 
 
 
Triggers of change 
 
But at the very point in the 1990s that the decline of Britain’s cities had become the 
conventional wisdom, and the inner city problem adopted as a more or less essential part of 
any government’s agenda, something important did change in British urban trends. 
 
The earliest and most radical change occurred in London when the long period of population 
decline came to an end and when, after the recession of 1989-92, employment in London 
started growing again.  The turnaround in London’s fortunes has been well documented (see 
Gardiner et al 2012), though it took a little while to become widely recognised.  London’s 
economy began to grow not just in line with the growth of the UK economy in the wake of 
recession, but its rate of growth began to outstrip the national average by some margin and 
this trend has continued more or less to the present time. 
 
In the provincial big cities – all substantially smaller than London – the change in trend 
occurred a little later and the scale of the change was less pronounced.  Indeed, in the 
following section we look more closely at just how much employment trends in these places 
really have changed.  Nevertheless, by the early 2000s there began to be visible evidence of 
a turnaround.  This was most evident in the physical renewal of the big provincial cities, and 
in particular of their city centres, which began to remove the legacy of deindustrialisation and 
present a new image.  But the population of the big provincial cities also began to stabilise 
and in some cases to expand, albeit in the context of quickening population growth in the UK 
as a whole. 
 
So what brought about this relatively abrupt – and historically significant – shift in trends in 
Britain’s big cities?  There were arguably four main factors at work. 
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The first and generally most overlooked factor is arithmetic.  The decline in manufacturing 
employment in the cities, which had driven so many key trends in their economies prior to 
the 1990s, did not come to an end.  Rather, the UK continued to shed manufacturing jobs 
and manufacturing accounted for an ever smaller share of total UK employment.  Nor did the 
UK’s big cities suddenly regain some lost locational advantage for manufacturing industry 
over other places.  Arithmetic matters because a continuing decline of manufacturing 
employment, at the same percentage rate, accounts for fewer and fewer jobs as the stock of 
manufacturing jobs declines.  Likewise, as manufacturing accounts for a smaller and smaller 
share of total employment, other sectors of the city economy begin to have a bigger 
influence on overall growth.  Or to put this another way, the urban-rural shift in 
manufacturing may have continued but it no longer mattered so much to urban economies. 
 
The second factor behind the change in trends is regeneration money.  Collectively, this 
funding has been considerable and whilst individual schemes have inevitably varied in their 
scale, effectiveness and impact, their cumulative impact on urban economies was always 
likely to be considerable.  The various initiatives since the 1980s have included Urban 
Development Corporations, City Challenge, Enterprise Zones, the Neighbourhood Renewal 
Fund, Derelict Land Grant, New Deal for Communities, the Working Neighbourhoods Fund 
and Single Regeneration Budget.  Some of these were programmes specifically targeted at 
urban areas.  Others were focused on disadvantaged communities across the whole country 
but in practice included large parts of the big cities.  Further funding streams – notably 
Lottery grants – ended up allocated disproportionately to the big cities even though this was 
never the explicit intention.  The physical renewal of Britain’s big cities, which has often 
paved the way for economic renewal, owes much to these myriad streams of public funding.  
We are not arguing that this was money wasted (as others have, for example Leunig and 
Swaffield 2007), but that the revival of Britain’s large cities was not driven solely, or even 
mainly, by the agglomeration benefits espoused by adherents to the NEG and NUE. 
 
The third factor behind the change in trends in cities is the composition of UK growth.  The 
long period of sustained economic growth between 1993 and 2008 had distinctive features.  
It was a period marked by strong growth in specific parts of the service sector, by rising 
consumer spending and by expanding public services.  It was not a period marked by 
significant expansion in manufacturing output, which essentially stagnated.  Just about all 
the drivers of national economic growth were ones that favoured the big cities.  Growth in 
financial services favoured London and the other big cities, where so much of this sector 
clusters.  Rising spending on retailing and leisure favoured city centres, where these 
activities are concentrated.  Higher education expanded, often in the cities, and the 
expansion in the health service benefited big city teaching hospitals.  The property world 
flourished, again mostly in city and town centres. 
 
The fourth factor behind the change in trends is globalisation.  This is more relevant to 
London than the UK’s other big cities because only London is a truly global city with a role 
extending far beyond national boundaries.  The globalisation of financial services, with 
London as one of just a handful of international hubs, has proved to be of immense value to 
not just to its banks and financial institutions but also to a wide range of other London-based 
business, such as legal services.  London has also become a destination of choice for the 
world’s super-rich, levering in immense spending on property and high-end consumer 
services.  More generally, property investment has flowed into London from around the 
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globe.  High levels of international migration, above all into London and at both high and low 
levels in the labour market, have allowed London’s economy to expand faster than otherwise 
would have been the case. 
 
 
But how much really changed? 
 
That London’s economy has experienced an upturn since the 1990s, in comparison to the 
rest of the UK, is not disputed.  The more contentious issue is whether this upturn has been 
shared by the UK’s other big cities.  
 
The most comprehensive evidence on employment in the big cities beyond London comes 
from Champion and Townsend (2011, 2013).  They analysed aggregate employment trends 
in eight (and later nine) cities – Birmingham, Bristol, Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, 
Newcastle, Nottingham and Sheffield, plus Glasgow in the later study – using statistics from 
the UK government’s Annual Business Inquiry and its predecessors.  Champion and 
Townsend’s employment data, which they adjust onto a ‘full-time equivalent’ basis, provides 
evidence on the core cities and on their wider city regions over the period since 1984.  A 
number of important conclusions emerge: 
 
• In the wake of the early 1990s recession, employment in the core city regions 
recovered more slowly than in London. 
 
• Over the subsequent long period of national economic growth up to 2007, the growth 
in the core cities and in their wider city regions was slower than the national average. 
 
• Core city employment grew faster than in the rest of the city regions only in the 1998-
2002 sub-period 
 
• English metropolitan counties lost more jobs than the national average in the post-
2007 recession 
 
Taken as a whole, these empirical observations do not provide a ringing endorsement of job 
growth in the big provincial cities.  They also confirm the difficulty of generalising from 
London’s manifest upturn to employment trends in cities in the rest of the country. 
 
There is however an important caveat.  Champion and Townsend’s most recent data, as yet 
unpublished but included in a conference presentation (Champion and Townsend 2015), 
points to much stronger growth in the core cities after 2012.  The new data, taken from the 
Labour Force Survey, which includes the self-employed, shows that between 2012 and 2014 
employment in the core cities expanded by 7.6 per cent on a full-time equivalent basis, 
compared to 1.4 per cent in the rest of the city region and 3.9 per cent across Great Britain 
as a whole.  Here, perhaps, is evidence that the big cities are indeed leading UK regional 
growth. 
 
Caution would however be advisable.  This particular two-year period may be unusual.  The 
post-2007 recession was severe, and equivalent data for 2010-12 shows a continuing 
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relative decline in the core cities – a fall in employment of 1.4 per cent, compared to growth 
of 0.8 per cent nationally (Champion and Townsend 2015).  The 2012-14 growth in the core 
cities may be a distinctive feature of recovery from recession rather than the beginning of a 
new longer-term trend, a point made by Champion (2015) in relation to the sustainability of 
the observed recovery of city populations.  It is worth noting, nevertheless, that the 
somewhat extravagant claims made by the core cities about their role in regional growth long 
pre-date the new data. 
 
The Champion and Townsend evidence, which on balance remains distinctly ambivalent 
about the role of the big cities outside London, is supported by two other recent studies.  The 
first by Martin et al (2014), based on 63 principal urban areas across the UK, found a 
negative relationship between city size and output growth over the period 1981-2011.  In 
other words, bigger cities grew more slowly.  London was however an outlier, and there was 
also an important North-South divide, with cities in the South generally faring better than 
those in the North.  A potential complication, however, is that the long period since 1981 
straddles years both before and after the apparent resurgence of the UK’s cities. 
 
The other recent study is by the Centre for Cities (2015a), using the same principal urban 
areas but covering the years from 2004 to 2013.  This found net job growth in southern cities 
of 12.4 per cent, but only 0.9 per cent in northern cities.  Again, therefore, what seems to 
matter in the UK context is not a city’s size but rather is regional location.  Among the 63 
principal urban areas, London had the second fastest growth in overall employment at 17.1 
per cent – exceeded only by Milton Keynes, a ‘new town’ rather than a city – and the fastest 
rate of growth in private sector employment.  The big provincial cities were much further 
behind. 
 
The relatively weak performance of the northern provincial cities is consistent with the 
observation that GVA per head has risen more slowly in northern Britain than in southern 
Britain, with the gap (in 2006 prices) widening from around £2,500 per capita per year in 
1971 to £7,000 in 2009 (Gardiner et al 2012). 
 
 
 
The relative strengths of cities and other places 
 
We may therefore begin to conclude that in the UK context the geography of contemporary 
economic growth is substantially more complex than just ‘cities good, other places bad’.  But 
in any case, simplifications of this kind gloss over differences that are likely to be important 
to specific sectors or businesses.  There are unquestionably some sorts of economic activity 
that cities are better at than other places, but equally there are some things that non-city 
areas do better. 
 
Similarly, different firms do better in different types of places, and the benefits of industry-
clustering varies by industry and size of establishment (Duranton and Overman 2005).  
Firms dependent on high-skilled labour, for example, have more to gain from locating in a 
large city.  Cost-sensitive firms and those requiring large inputs of land have more to gain 
from locating in smaller settlements.  Therefore, the national economy benefits from the 
availability of what Dijkstra (2013) refers to as a ‘portfolio of places’ (including large cities, 
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smaller cities, towns and rural areas) that can collectively meet the needs of a range of 
industries and a variety of sizes and types of firm. 
 
In theory, a large city with a large population and an agglomeration of varied businesses 
offers a more competitive location for firms that value these characteristics, provided of 
course that the benefits are not outweighed by disbenefits such as congestion and high land 
and property prices.  The list below is not necessarily exhaustive, but in the 21st century 
context UK cities are potentially good at: 
 
• Providing regional facilities, because they are a central place (in terms of population 
if not necessarily physical location) from which services can be delivered to the 
surrounding region 
 
• Consumption-based activities, such as retailing and leisure, where consumers often 
prefer the wider choice that a concentration of businesses in city centres can offer 
 
• ‘Networked’ industries, in which a close working relationship (formal and informal) 
with suppliers, consumers and competitors is central to the business model 
 
• Specialised services, which require a large and accessible market 
 
• Some R&D and innovation, where networks of professionals and contacts with city-
based universities and corporate headquarters are important 
 
• Providing a big pool of labour, which is necessary for some employers that are 
individually large, expect a high staff turnover or need to recruit specialist staff 
 
• Multiple big employers, who would find the competition for labour in smaller places 
simply too great 
 
• Attracting migrants, nationally and internationally, which helps overcome shortfalls in 
local labour supply, including at higher skill levels 
 
• Providing a ‘locational ‘brand’, in establishing national and international recognition 
 
• Transport links, in that big cities generally have the airports, railways and motorway 
connections that facilitate business links to places further afield 
 
But city size and perhaps more importantly urban density, which generally rises with size, 
also have important disadvantages for some economic activities.  Just as there are 
agglomeration economies that work in cities’ favour, there are diseconomies of scale that 
add to costs and work in favour of smaller and less dense places.  The list below, again not 
necessarily exhaustive, highlights the sorts of activities and attributes in which non-city areas 
generally have an advantage: 
 
• Space-intensive industries, which have difficulty in being physically accommodated 
within major built-up areas 
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• Logistics and distribution hubs, which generally require not only substantial space but 
also direct access to the motorway network, which is generally easier to provide at 
junctions away from the big cities and away from congestion 
 
• Industries with ‘negative externalities’ – or to put it another way, industries that make 
bad neighbours – which are best located away from concentrations of population 
 
• A captive and stable workforce, which is easier for employers to maintain where 
there are fewer alternative sources of employment in the local labour market 
 
• Lower costs, certainly compared to London’s high labour costs but also in most cities 
for land and property 
 
• Environmental quality, where this is important in attracting certain types of labour or 
in projecting a particular business image 
 
• Footloose ‘lifestyle’ businesses, in which the entrepreneur’s own locational 
preferences matter more than the imperatives of the business environment  
 
• Accommodating overspill growth, which is hard to fit into the largest cities 
 
• Labour and consumers for nearby cities – a place to live beyond the city but not 
disconnected from the city 
 
Attempting to seek a simple answer to the role of cities in regional growth is therefore 
perhaps to misunderstand the complexity of economic processes.  There are some things 
that cities do better, and in these activities they might be expected to play a leading role in 
economic growth, but there are other activities in which non-city areas are likely to have a 
competitive advantage.  For the small firm reliant on the labour, markets and networks that a 
highly urban area can offer, there may be no alternative to a big city location.  For the 
national distribution depot, a city location may be a hindrance rather than a help. 
 
 
Cities in their regional context 
 
What a comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of cities and non-cities also illustrates 
is the extent to which in practice these two locations are often interdependent.  Furthermore, 
the causality in terms of economic growth does not necessarily run only from cities to their 
hinterlands.  The prosperity and growth of the hinterland is itself likely to be a key driver of 
growth in the city. 
 
The dependence, in part, of cities on the prosperity of their regions helps to explain why 
growth in the UK’s northern cities has lagged behind growth in cities in the south.  Many 
parts of northern Britain beyond the cities – the former coalfields, for example, and the textile 
towns of Lancashire and Yorkshire – have for years experienced major job loss.  The 
industries that once underpinned the economies of these places have often disappeared 
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entirely and though regeneration efforts have not been without positive effects (see for 
instance Beatty et al 2007 on the former coalfields) the scale of new job creation has 
invariably fallen short in filling the gap left by the old industries.  The weakness of the 
economy across so many older industrial towns in northern England, central Scotland and 
south Wales will have exerted a downward drag on the growth of nearby cities. 
 
At the most basic level, cities and their regions are linked by commuting networks.  In 2011, 
45 per cent of the jobs located in the core cities were held by commuters from outside the 
local authority (Houston 2015).  This is to be expected, given that the city local authorities 
are integral parts of wider built-up areas and there is always likely to be large-scale 
commuting into city centres.  But even taking the English metropolitan counties as a whole, 
17 per cent of all jobs located there in 2011 were held by in-commuters.  Commuting flows 
also work in the opposite direction, though less powerfully.  In 2011, 28 per cent of employed 
residents in the core cities travelled to work out of the local authority, and 11 per cent of 
employed residents in the metropolitan counties as a whole worked elsewhere. 
 
Commuting flows on this scale are a powerful mechanism for transmitting city growth to 
neighbouring areas.  The wages and salaries earned in the city support consumer spending 
in neighbouring areas and, as a result, employment in private sector services in the regional 
hinterlands is higher than would otherwise have been the case.  The commuters and their 
families also underpin substantial public sector employment, in schools for example, 
because so many public services are delivered in the places where people live rather than 
where they work. 
 
Commuting flows also have the effect of transmitting labour market conditions from one 
place to another.  Commuters into the city add to the local competition for jobs and raise 
employment among residents of the hinterland. 
 
The interdependence between cities and their regions is however far more extensive than 
just the daily flow of commuters.  Many jobs located in cities are directly supported by 
demand from businesses and consumers in their hinterlands.  These include employment in 
city centre retailing, in leisure, in culture and entertainment, in business services geared to 
the local and regional market, in higher education and in healthcare.  A larger and more 
prosperous regional hinterland results in greater employment in the city.  In this respect, the 
scale and the prosperity of the hinterland act as key motors of city growth: the city follows 
what is happening elsewhere rather than drives growth itself. 
 
Arguably, the economic dependence of UK cities on their regions has been increasing 
through time.  Rising car ownership, in particular, has increased the accessibility of city 
centres to many households and improvements in public transport have generally had a 
similar effect.  The consequence is that many consumer services that were once delivered 
locally, near to where people live, are now drawn into the city centres.  Retailing probably 
provides the clearest example.  Over the years, shoppers have gravitated towards the 
largest urban centres where they are offered not only greater choice but also access to 
specialist outlets that could not survive in a smaller marketplace.  There are now numerous 
empty shops in the second, third and fourth tier urban centres around Britain.  The pull of the 
big city centres, where retailing generally goes from strength to strength, is one of the 
reasons. 
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The flow of consumer spending into the big city centres illustrates the point that the 
relationship between the cities and their regions is not necessarily a benign one.  Spending 
does not increase just because consumers have more choice about where to spend their 
money; rather, this is a zero-sum gain, with some places benefitting directly at the expense 
of others.  In practice, it is the biggest cities that have gained at the expense of their 
neighbours, particularly in relation to retail investments. 
 
Empirical evidence based on skills, economic output, employment, industrial composition 
and qualitative interviews with economic development professionals in northern English city-
regions (focussed on Leeds, Liverpool, Manchester, Newcastle and Sheffield) led to the 
development of the following typology of relationships between small towns and their larger 
city neighbours (Jones et al 2011): 
i) independent (strong local economy, weak links to city); 
ii) isolated (weak local economy, weak links to city); 
iii) dependent (weak local economy, strong links to city); and 
iv) interdependent (strong local economy, strong links to city). 
 
 
Looking to the future 
 
There must also be a question-mark about whether the upturn in the relative performance of 
UK cities since the 1990s (albeit more modest than sometimes claimed) will be sustained 
into the future.  As noted earlier, the particular composition of UK economic growth from 
1993 to 2008 contributed to the upturn in the big cities, but growth during this era displayed 
distinctive features.  Arguably, the drivers of growth in the years up to 2008 are not 
replicable in the future, or at least not in a sustainable way. 
 
The post-2008 recession exposed the limitations of a model of UK growth based on 
consumer spending fuelled by rising debt and on ever higher public spending.  These had 
been key contributors to city growth in financial services, retailing and leisure and in parts of 
the public sector.  The recession brought a halt.  The upturn in the UK economy from 2012 
onwards was mainly brought about by a rekindling of the pre-2008 growth model, and in 
particular by a restoration of mortgage borrowing (and thereby rising household debt) to 
something nearer pre-recession levels.  But by 2015 the UK had a record deficit on its 
foreign trade, one of the highest levels of household debt in the world, and a continuing and 
substantial government budget deficit.  The post-2012 recovery looks a lot like the last gasp 
of an old and discredited model of growth. 
 
What the UK economy really needs is rebalancing.  There needs to be an increase in 
exports and in investment, and a regional rebalancing of growth rates.  High and volatile 
property prices in booming cities reduce profit, increase risk and curtail lower value-added 
activities (Dijkstra 2013).  Sharp regional differences in the cost of living inhibit internal 
migration as a mechanism to help regional rebalancing and improve labour market matching 
(Overman et al 2010).  Poverty, unemployment and dereliction in weaker regions deter 
investment (Glaeser and Gottlieb 2009).  Empirical evidence from across European cities 
suggests that countries with more balanced settlement systems have higher national 
economic output (Parkinson et al 2012). 
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Rising household spending needs to be rooted in rising incomes, not rising debt, and tax 
revenue rather than borrowing needs to underpin public expenditure.  There is actually a 
consensus on the need for progress in these directions, even if delivery has so far been 
elusive.  Arguably, there is now no alternative way forward if UK economic growth is to be 
sustained. 
 
This has important implications for UK cities because if rebalancing does occur it will favour 
certain sectors and places.  In particular, it is hard to envisage an increase in exports on the 
scale the UK needs without a major contribution from manufacturing.  Finance, business and 
professional services, tourism and higher education are major potential export earners for 
the future, but with manufacturing still accounting for nearly half of all UK export earnings it is 
unavoidably an essential component of rebalancing. 
 
The relevance to the geography of economic growth is that manufacturing has to a 
significant extent already deserted the UK’s biggest cities, as noted earlier.  If there were to 
be a revival of manufacturing output it would therefore not favour the cities to any substantial 
extent.  Instead, there might be a distinctly more multi-centric pattern of UK economic growth 
than of late, with many of the manufacturing towns beyond the big cities playing a leading 
role in economic growth. 
 
There are limits, of course, to just how far rebalancing and a revival of manufacturing would 
alter the relationship between UK cities and their regions.  Even if there were to be an upturn 
in manufacturing output it would not necessarily generate huge numbers of jobs because 
productivity in manufacturing tends to rise faster than in other sectors of the economy.  
There would be no return to pre-1980s levels of manufacturing employment.  Likewise, the 
cities would continue to exert a pull on retail spending and they would remain the preferred 
location for many office-based activities.  So economic rebalancing would probably imply a 
shift in recent trends rather than a complete reversal.  A return to the pre-1990 days of 
absolute reductions in population and employment in the UK’s major cities seems unlikely. 
 
The point is that just as there is interdependence between cities and their regions there is 
also interdependence between cities and the national economy.  Cities are a large and 
important part of the UK but the national economy is more than just the arithmetic sum of its 
component parts.  The national economy has a dynamic of its own, driven by factors such as 
interest rates, budget deficits, the exchange rate and the growth of the world economy.  At 
any particular time these dynamics may, or may not, favour growth in the cities.  In the UK 
context, the urgent requirement for a different model of national economic growth means that 
urban trends in the twenty years up to 2015 may offer a distinctly imperfect guide to the 
future. 
 
 
Conclusions and policy implications 
 
Let us return, therefore, to the central question: are big cities really the motor of UK regional 
economic growth?  Our conclusion is that the UK’s big cities cannot really claim a monopoly 
on this role.  They have distinct strengths as a location for some businesses but not for 
others, who may indeed thrive better in places beyond the cities.  The economic growth of 
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cities does have beneficial impacts on neighbouring areas, but equally the prosperity of cities 
depends in part on the prosperity of their wider regions.  And in addition to the beneficial 
impacts of cities on neighbouring areas, there can be powerful detrimental effects as well 
through the diversion of retailing and other services into the big cities at the expense of 
second and third tier regional centres. 
 
Our conclusions are therefore far more nuanced than the claims made by, for example, the 
Core Cities group of local authorities.  The UK’s major cities, especially London, are no 
longer the epicentre of job loss they were for much of the second half of the twentieth 
century.  But nor are they the only places that growth now occurs and, looking ahead, 
rebalancing the national economy may in some respects work against them. 
 
Indeed, a key feature of the UK economy over many years is not so much the pre-eminence 
of cities as the widening gaps in productivity and growth between regions (Gardiner et al 
2013, Robson 2015).  Cities in the south generally fare better, on a range of economic 
indicators, than those in the north.  The performance of the region, rather than the city, 
seems to offer a better way forward to understanding the UK’s contemporary spatial 
economy. 
 
None of these conclusions undermine the case for mechanisms of governance that integrate 
UK cities with their immediate hinterlands.  Indeed, the strong economic links in both 
directions between cities and their surrounding areas offers a powerful rationale for 
governance arrangements that extend over the whole of each city-region.  Economic 
development, transport and planning are all deeply inter-connected at this larger spatial 
scale and powers over them are best exercised in a coordinated way at this level.  The 
justification for devolution, nevertheless, is not that cities have some unique dynamism that 
can only be harnessed by transferring powers to local players.  Rather, the more mundane 
justification is that city-region management structures make best use of local knowledge and 
reflect the genuine interconnections between places and bring residents, businesses and 
investors closer to decision making, which are desirable in their own right irrespective of 
measurable economic outcomes which may (or indeed may not) result (Tomaney et al 
2011). 
 
But our conclusions also indicate that city-region governance should not be equated with a 
reliance on growth and jobs just in the city itself.  Away from London, the UK’s biggest cities 
have a distinctly mixed record as job-generators, even in the better years since the early 
1990s.  Other places within the city-regions, and beyond, also have the proven potential for 
growth.  What this suggests is that a presupposition favouring big cities for economic 
development resources, on the assumption that they are the sole or dominant motors of 
wider UK regional growth, would be quite wrong.  The opportunities for growth, and for 
economic rebalancing, should be supported wherever they happen to occur. 
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